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DE-LINKING: DON QUIXOTE,
GLOBALIZATION AND THE COLONIES
Walter D. Mignolo

D

on Quixote is a “literary” achievement of a European historical
process and a major literary contribution of Europe to the world and to
diverse human histories and civilizations. Don Quixote was to Europe
what pyramids were to the Egyptians, or calendars to the makers and
carriers of Mayan civilization. At the height of European nationalism and the particular articulation of Eurocentrism that nationalism
nourished (e.g., nation-state building and values following the U.S.
and French revolutions), Don Quixote and the other masterpieces of
European literature were all works in modern imperial languages,
grounded in Greek and Latin traditions. These historical processes,
especially the consolidation of modern imperial languages and the
celebration of Greek and Latin, were simultaneous with the rejection of
the debt that European intellectual history owed to the Arabic translation of Greek authors. The simultaneity of both processes contributed
to the great achievements of humanity and to the dichotomy between
the accumulation of money and the accumulation of meaning that put
Western Europe at the center of global capitalism and global epistemology (which was the theoretical justification of artistic practices—
from painting to literature, from music to sculpture). Some of the great
achievements in European history were also simultaneous with the
destruction and disavowal of the achievements of the Aztecs and Incas,
as well as with the denial of humanity to Africans transported as slave
labor to the New World. The celebration of Cervantes’s achievement in
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Don Quixote shall not—at this point in history—continue to reproduce
the darker side of the European Renaissance.
I am asking, therefore, a reading of Don Quixote that is attentive
to the demands that motivated Cervantes to write it. How can we
link the present of Cervantes to our own present? My thesis is that
Cervantes was experiencing the emergence of the sovereignty of the
modern subject that rejected the authority of Theology. He was living in the moment of transition from Theology to “Ego-logy” (that
René Descartes formulated in philosophical language a few decades
after the publication of Don Quixote). Today, however, we are all living
during a different kind of transition. This transition is highlighted by
the coming into being of the decolonial subject. “Coming into being”
translates to the decolonization of being. If, then, a decolonial subject is
emerging in our era, when was that subject colonized? The paradox is
that the coloniality of being—the colonization of subjects in the modern world—was one of the consequences of the European Renaissance
and the expansion of European imperial/colonial designs. Cervantes
wrote Don Quixote approximately one century after the colonization of
America (for some) and the invention of America (for others).
One reading available to us today is within a paradigm of coexistence rather than “a new reading” within the paradigm of Western
genres, thought, sensibility, and the very concept of literature. The
game of solving all the problems within Eurocentered paradigms of
thought that “think about” the others is over. The others began to think
for themselves in relation to Europe almost five centuries ago, when
they realized that the “wonderful” solutions Europeans had for their
lives were not convincing to them. That happened in the Americas in
the sixteenth century and continues to happen in Iraq in the twentyfirst century, only it is not Europe but the U.S. that is continuing the
mission toward a future of glory and happiness for all. Thus, the
other began to think a long time ago, but it was shut off. Of course,
why would European men take into consideration what other people
thought if they had the solution for all of them? The Europeans knew
how to manage happiness for all.
Waman Puma de Ayala, a Quechua speaker from Yancavalica (a
community near Cuzco that was the center of the Incanate or the Inca
Empire, in Eurocentered vocabulary), offers an anchor to speak from a
paradigm of coexistence. A contemporary of Cervantes, Waman Puma
is struggling not to assert the modern subject but, rather, to decolonize the colonial subject. Of the same generation as Cervantes, he
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finished in 1616 and sent to Philip III a manuscript consisting of drawings and texts written in broken Spanish, titled Nueva corónica y buen
gobierno. It was a story of indigenous people of the Andes, partially
or badly understood by Spanish chroniclers; a story that was necessary for the establishment of a good government, ruled and shared by
Spaniards and “Indians” (the generic name given by the Spaniards to
the diversity of Aymara- and Quechua-speaking communities). The
point here is that while Cervantes, in Spain at the inception of modern Europe, was contributing to the formation of the modern subject,
released from theological authority, Waman Puma, in the colonies,
was doing something similar but at the same time different. He was
striving to decolonize Quechua and Aymara subjects. Put in different
words, while Cervantes was critiquing Spain in Spain—imperial formation from inside the empire—and liberating the subject from Theology entrenched with imperialism (see Frederick de Armas’s essay in
this volume), Waman Puma was critiquing imperial/colonial formation
in the colonies. Cervantes’s subjectivity was formed in the legacies of
Greek, Latin, and Castilian (as one of the six European and imperial
vernacular languages). Waman Puma’s subjectivity was formed in the
memories of Quechua and Aymara, disrupted by the invasion of Castilian languages, political theory, subjectivity, and rapacious economic
interests. The disturbing complexity of Waman Puma’s text parallels
the well-crafted, layered mirror-effects and humorous Don Quixote,
but for different reasons. Waman Puma was thinking, drawing, and
writing at the very crack of the colonial difference: a spatial epistemic
break irreducible to the mono-topic and linear time of the European
construction of its own history, from Greece to Rome to modern capitalist empires of the Atlantic (Spain and England mainly, but also Holland and France). Waman Puma introduced something I would like
to call (after Mary Gossy’s talk) “the decolonial queer” in the precise
sense that Waman Puma disrupts, on the one hand, the imperial norms
that the Spaniards intended to force upon well-established Andean
society in its entire order of life and, on the other, introduces the decolonial principle of thinking (e.g., decolonial thinking) that has never
stopped but was silenced by modern and imperial epistemology from
the European Renaissance until now.
Thus, instead of reading Don Quixote from the principles of knowledge and understanding inherited from Greek and Latin—that since
the European Renaissance and through European imperial expansion,
from religion to economy, from subjectivity to knowledge, was assumed
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to be universal—I will read it from the colonies, from the silenced epistemology introduced by Waman Puma which, in the twentieth century,
we find in Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (1952), Vine Deloria,
Jr.’s Custer Died for Your Sins (1973), and Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderland/
La Frontera (1987). I will read it from a paradigm that is not reducible
to the hegemony of Western thought from the Renaissance to today
or anchored in Greece, Rome, and Jerusalem. This paradigm is “pluriversal”: it emerges from the histories of languages, epistemologies, and
subjectivities that in the past five-hundred years had to deal with the
expansive move of Western languages, epistemologies, and subjectivities (around which political theory and political economy have been
imagined and implemented). It is the paradigm of decolonial thinking.
In relation to one of the questions asked during the Roundtable
pointing toward my privileged situation at Duke University as a
“white” person, I should say that I am in part renouncing my privileges.
As a Third World (Argentinian) person of European descent (who is
neither European nor Black nor Indian) who was trained through the
reading of Greek, Latin, and modern European texts—in Argentina
first and then in France—as if there was no other way of thinking
than the way Europeans thought, I could embrace the marginal privileges and (like Condoleeza Rice or Alberto Gonzalez) join the elite in
power. However, while my training was forced upon me (I did not
choose to be born in such and such a place or to study this and that in
high school), now I am renouncing the imposed privileges. I am learning to unlearn. I prefer to start thinking based upon Waman Puma,
Fanon, and Anzaldúa, instead of doing it with Aristotle or Plato, Kant
or Bourdieu as my intellectual guides. I will then go the other way
round. Thinking from Waman Puma, I will interpret Don Quixote, Kant,
Marx, and Foucault. Decolonial thinking means, precisely, performing
a decolonial shift: shifting from the imperial/colonial epistemology as
well as from the internal imperial critiques by Las Casas, Cervantes,
Marx, Foucault, and so on. Decolonial thinking is the freeing and the
clearing of the coloniality of being, and that cannot be done from the
perspective of Aristotle, Cervantes, Marx, etc. It has to be done from
the perspective of people like Waman Puma, Fanon, and Anzaldúa.
There is an irreducible difference between the diversity of imperial/
colonial thinking (usually referred to as Western thought) and decolonial thinking. That difference is not cultural but colonial. It is indeed
the colonial difference that, through racism, was built from the impe-
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rial perspective, and in which critical minds like Las Casas and Marx
have been caught.
My references to Foucault, below, shall not be taken as a call to
authority (Cervantes precisely taught us to question authority), but
as a reference to someone whose opinions and arguments I respect.
Foucault’s arguments are inscribed in the genealogy of Cervantes. It
is not surprising that Foucault was able to read Cervantes in the way
he did. Here I am attempting even to de-link Foucault and open up a
new space, the freeing and the clearing of the coloniality of being that
Waman Puma so masterfully blew up (and paid the price). I inscribe
myself, then, in the decolonial paradigm, a paradigm of coexistence
irreducible to the linear changes of epistemés (as Foucault had it). I am
also referring to the emergence of the decolonial paradigm of coexistence, a spatial epistemic break, and stating that this break was introduced by Waman Puma. The insistence on coexistence means that it
is irreducible to the chronological celebration of newness (e.g., a new
episteme, a new paradigm) that characterizes the timeline, spatially
restricted, of modern European imperial formations (once again, from
Greece and Rome, from Greek and Latin to the Atlantic capitalist
empires and to vernacular European imperial languages).
The decolonial shift is not a new paradigm, allow me to insist, but
a paradigm-other that emerged from the spatial epistemic break in the
sixteenth-century Spanish colonies and was rearticulated in British and
French colonies in Africa and Asia since the nineteenth century. The
decolonial shift means thinking from the colonial difference (not cultural, but colonial); that is, from the space that imperial epistemology
classified as the place of no-thinking, the place of the barbarians, the
inferiors, the primitives who had to learn to think by studying Greek
and Latin and modern European imperial languages. It is from that
space, the space out-of-history, silenced, epistemically disavowed, that
I intend to respectfully read Don Quixote.
*****
A set of narrative strategies anchored the ideological and aesthetic
impact and enduring effect of Don Quixote. First is the consecration,
by the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries, of alphabetic literacy and its consequences for the composition of
a complex and multilayered narrative. Second is the consecration of
the printing press by the same period, reinforcing alphabetic literacy.
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Vernacular languages emerging from Greek and Latin made possible
the canonical works of “literature” (in general, as alphabetical written
text in European imperial languages) that were recognized all over the
non-European world thanks to the colonial expansion of European
countries that produced substantial literary genius. Third, Don Quixote
introduced various fractures with literary norms inherited from the
European Middle Ages, particularly the rapid growth of alphabetic
literacy around the twelfth century. Cervantes explicitly addressed
several of these fractures in the preface to the first part of Don Quixote. Fourth, Cervantes worked with the emergence of a new kind of
readership, particularly the reader of “popular literature.” At that time
in Spain people read chivalric romances. Cervantes published Don
Quixote roughly one-hundred-and-forty years after the introduction of
the printing press in Europe, which the prologue takes into account.
Fifth, the fracture between fictional narratives (chivalric romance) and
the daily life that Don Quixote confronts also structures the entire
narrative, with Sancho Panza as a mediator between the two worlds.
It disrupts the basic assumptions of a denotative philosophy of language that has ruled the Greco-Roman and Christian politics of knowledge ever since Plato. The disjunction between the fictional narratives
embraced by Don Quixote and his everyday life is complemented and
complicated by the mirror-effect of Don Quixote learning at the beginning of the second part, when he is the reader of his own adventures.
This particular fracture is indeed twofold. On the one hand, there is
the fracture in enunciation that rejects the supra-subject constraints
of “authority” (e.g., the refusal in the prologue to comply with the
requirements of quotations, references, notes, etc., and at the same
time, the affirmation of the sovereignty of a new subjectivity that was
described as the modern subject). On the other hand, it contributes to
the displacement of the hegemony of Theo-logical principles of knowledge and reality toward a new politics of knowledge that I would
describe as Ego-logical (e.g., secularization, the autonomy of reason,
and the authority of the individual). It is this fracture, in all its complexity within European history, that Michel Foucault picked up in his
introduction to Les mots et les choses when he observes:
Don Quixote is the first modern work of literature, because in it we see the
cruel reason of identities and differences make endless sport of signs and
similitudes; because in it language breaks off its old kinship with things
and enters into that lonely sovereignty from which it will reappear, in
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its separated state, only as literature; because it marks the point where
resemblance enters an age which is, from the point of view of resemblance, one of madness and imagination. Once similitude and signs are
sundered from each other, two experiences can be established and two
characters appear face to face.1

There is one particular instance of the concepts “two experiences”
and “two characters” that I would like to push further. To do so, I
need to de-link from the history and experiences of Western Christian and secular Europe and their corresponding conceptual structures and structure of feelings; that is, from a cosmology grounded
in the languages and experiences of European men. Other histories
and experiences whose conceptual structures and structure of feelings,
grounded in language and experiences alien to European men, were
silenced because they were considered inferior, from the perspective
of European cosmologies. The imperial perspective was assumed to be
the only valid one and therefore superior. To de-link means to make
visible coexisting paradigms of thought that have been silenced and
disavowed. I will read Don Quixote from paradigms of coexistence.
Waman Puma de Ayala, in colonial Peru at the time of Cervantes, will
show us the way.
However, we should remember an intermediary step taken indirectly by Jorge Luis Borges and followed up by Michel Foucault.
Borges, who wrote several pieces on Cervantes and Don Quixote, also
wrote a piece on a certain Chinese encyclopedia in which the animal
kingdom was classified in such a way that it made Foucault laugh. But
it was precisely the fracture, the disruption of the classificatory logic
invented by Borges and attributed to an imaginary Chinese encyclopedia, that Foucault linked to the disruption of a naturalized conception of space produced by Velásquez in Las Meninas and by Cervantes
in the second part of Don Quixote, when the character in the novel is
able to read his own adventures, narrated in the first part, which had
already been published. Foucault’s laugh and Borges’s classificatory
“un-logic” may not be in the same epistemic space. Perhaps Foucault
was not giving Borges full credit; or better yet, Foucault was not in the
right conditions to perceive Borges’s decolonial shift. Perhaps Borges
smiled at Foucault’s fresh naiveté and at the fact that while Cervantes
and Foucault were fracturing from inside the logic of Western thought,
Borges was playing a different game, a game that was closer to the
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rules established by Waman Puma than by those established by Cervantes and followed up by Foucault.
Don Quixote was published at the peak of drastic changes in European sensibilities and subjectivities. Ego-logy was taking over Theology, and the formation of the secular subject was displacing the
formation of the religious subject. Secular philosophy was taking over
the role of Theo-logical philosophy. The Theo-logical and Ego-logical
politics of knowledge are the overarching epistemic frames that shaped
political theory, political economy, aesthetics, and the entire domain of
subjectivity, from racial and gender configurations to the very idea of
“subject” itself. In other words, de-linking means to read Don Quixote,
recognizing but not accepting the rules of the game in which Don Quixote was written and has mainly been read until today. De-linking means
to admire Don Quixote as an outsider, playing a different game marked
by a diversity of “experiences”—not the experiences of the internal
history of Europe, but those of the colonies where, for example, the
primacy of alphabetic writing, the printing press, and the authority of
colonial languages were more of a problem than a victory. The problem was that people without letters were described and evaluated as
a people without history, and, of course, without literature.2 Foucault’s
“two experiences” and “two characters” points to the fracture within
European history and not to the fracture between Europe and the colonized areas of the world since the sixteenth century (including today’s
U.S. contribution to that long Western and capitalist imperial legacy).
Borges de-linked. Foucault co-opted Borges within the mono-logic (in
its internal diversity) of Western thought. Waman Puma most likely
did not know Cervantes, but he knew that his way of thinking was
not the same as that of Las Casas and other Spanish missionaries.
Cervantes was critical of Western legacies. Las Casas was critical of
Spanish conduct in the Indies. But Waman Puma introduced a way of
thinking that was not grounded in Western legacies, unlike Las Casas
and Cervantes. Waman Puma was facing Western memories while Las
Casas and Cervantes were enduring them. For Borges, the Western legacy was one among many (if, of course, the closest), and that explains
the planetary dimension of his thoughts and narratives.
Since the European Renaissance, including its darker side (the “discovery” of America), the dominant perspective on knowledge about
the world and human societies was framed by Theology. The trivium
and the quadrivium were the master models of understanding. Secularization and the displacement from the Theo-logical to the Ego-logi-
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cal conceptualization of knowledge and understanding were advanced
by Francis Bacon (Novum organum, 1620) and René Descartes (Discours de la méthode, 1636) in the first half of the seventeenth century.
Together with Cervantes, who preceded both, they shifted the geography of knowledge from Theology to a secular Philosophy and Science
(grounded in Ego-logy) that is still in full force today. The postmodern
critique of modernity (à la Foucault) primarily questions the authority
of Theo- and Ego-logical macro-narratives and the homogeneity of the
subject, but within the same rules imposed by the Theo-logical and
Ego-logical politics of knowledge. It never attempted to de-link but,
rather, to correct basic assumptions regarding totality and homogeneity that it displaced toward the singular and the fragments. In other
words, the Theo-logical and Ego-logical politics of knowledge shaped
what is generally understood as “modernity” and, consequently, what
is understood to be “postmodernity.”
Why should one de-link instead of offering a new interpretation of
Don Quixote that attempts to correct previous interpretations? Why
not remain within the same logical and political game; that is, why not
remain within the bubble of the Truman Show instead of moving away,
de-linking like Waman Puma and Borges did? Cervantes himself offers
the entry point to this need and possibility (although he himself fell
short of his own intuition) by attributing the narrative of Don Quixote
to Cide Hamete Benengeli. Thus, the original narrative was in Arabic,
not in Spanish. The Spanish version published in 1605 is supposed
to be a translation of the original narrative in Arabic. But things get
more complicated. At the beginning of the second part, the discussion
of the first part between the graduate from Salamanca, Don Quixote,
and Sancho Panza about the translation into Spanish of the original in
Arabic is no longer part of the original narrative. It looks like a narrative by the translator, since the reader does not know to what extent
the translator and Cide Hamete Benengeli worked together or knew
each other. Foucault’s speculation on resemblances, similitude, and
signs is disrupted by the entry of an alien character—the Arabic language. There is, of course, a philosophical tradition in Arabic built on
the translation of Greek philosophy. However, that tradition does not
lead directly to Cervantes, Bacon, and Descartes. It leads to Ibn Sina
(Avicenna) (Central Asia), al-Ghazali (Iran and Iraq), and Ibn Rushd
(Averroes) (Andalucia and Morocco). History is not an ascending linear move from any origin to an only and unique present. Greco-Arabic
philosophy coexists with Greco-Latin philosophy. It is only from a
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Western perspective that reality may look like that. Not from Borges’s
perspective, either. In a way, Cervantes himself is in part guilty of the
sin. What is relevant here is that the original narrative is in Arabic and
not in Latin. An original narrative in Latin would also have required a
translation into Spanish. However, it would not have introduced the
linguistic, theological, and philosophical fracture of a language like
Arabic, which is linked to the Quran while Latin is linked to the Bible.
Translation into Spanish from Arabic or Latin would always fulfill the
function of consolidating the Castilian language, which Elio Antonio
de Nebrija had formalized over a hundred years before, and aided by
Bernardo José de Alderete, who wrote the first history of the language.
However, Castilian is a language derived from Latin and inscribed in
Greco-Latin memories. Arabic is not and was not. What are the implications (that Cervantes did not take to its logical conclusion) of presenting Don Quixote as a narrative in Arabic written by a morisco?
There are no specific references or indications that Cide Hamete
Benengeli was relying upon or dialoguing with the philosophical tradition in Arabic (e.g., Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazali,
and, of course, the Quran). Of particular interest would be Ibn Rushd
(Averroes), who lived from 1126 to 1198. He, like Cervantes, was from
Andalucia. One of Averroes’s main legacies was his defense of philosophy against the attack of dogmatic theologians, arguing that there is
not, nor should there be, an incompatibility between philosophy and
religion. Or, he could have engaged with Averroes’s commentaries on
Aristotle’s topics, rhetoric, and poetics.3 Instead, Cervantes, as a good
man educated in Latin language and Greek-Latin legacies (instead
of Greek-Arabic ones), focused on the conflicts between history and
poetry.4 The good Sansón Carrasco, graduate of Salamanca (one of the
first European universities of Christian and Latin foundation, 1255),
discussed with Don Quixote and Sancho the narratives of the first part
of the story by Cide Hamete Benengeli. He replies to Don Quixote’s
complaints about certain parts of the veracity of the narrative by saying:
[T]rue…but it is one thing to write as a poet and another to write as a
historian: the poet can recount or sing about things not as they were, but
as they should have been, and the historian must write about them not
as they should have been, but as they were, without adding or subtracting anything from the truth (Edith Grossman translation, p. 476).
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It is not clear if this chapter is part of the original narrative by Cide
Hamete Benengeli or a translator intervention. However, the dilemma
of writing poetry or history was not an Arabic legacy in which, supposedly, Cide Hamete Benengeli was inscribed. Or was he just writing
in Arabic but with a Greco-Latin memory? Was Cide Hamete Benegeli
a sort of Inca Garcilaso de la Vega upside down, who was also writing
in Spanish in Andalucia at the beginning of the seventeenth century,
although inscribing Inca memories in his narrative? We know why
Inca Garcilaso inscribed Inca memories in Castilian languages, but we
do not have any idea of why Cide Hamete Benengeli would write in
Arabic to erase memories inscribed in Arabic language.
The distinction between history and poetry introduced by Carrasco
was by no means universal, although it is assumed and presented
as such in Don Quixote. Thus, the fact that the original narration is
authored by Cide Hamete Benengeli is either a superficial curiosity, since the categories of thought in the Arabic language are totally
absent, or it is a blatant act of colonization, since Cide Hamete Benengeli seems to be, like Cervantes, someone who is inscribed in the Latin
and Christian tradition. Recognizing this simple fact brings to the foreground what is absent and silenced: the differential theoretical issues
inscribed in other languages and memories (Arabic in this case, but
also Chinese, Bengali, Aymara, Urdu, etc.).
Let’s take one example of rationality outside of European assumptions about reason. The story that follows was told by German writer
Peter Bischel.
A young Balinese became my primary teacher. One day I asked him
if he believed that the history of Prince Rama—one of the holy books of
the Hindus—is true.
Without hesitation, he answered it with “Yes.”
So you believe that the Prince Rama lived somewhere and somewhen?
I do not know if he lived, he said.
Then it is a story?
Yes, it is a story.
Then someone wrote this story—I mean: a human being wrote it? I
answered and felt triumphant, when I thought I had convinced him.
But he said: It is quite possible that somebody invented this story. But true
it is, in any case.
Then—I replied—it is the case that Prince Rama did not live on this
earth?
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What is it that you want to know?, he asked. Do you want to know
whether the story is true, or merely whether it occurred?5

I can imagine that Sansón Carrasco, graduate of Salamanca (equivalent to graduating from Harvard today), would have dismissed the
young Balinese teacher as someone still living in the mountains, disconnected from civilization. I can imagine that the young Balinese teacher
(in the twenty-first century) would consider any Sansón Carrasco of
our day irrational. “What is with these people who cannot distinguish
what is true from what happened?,” he would most likely ask. We are
here in the terrain of de-linking; that is, putting hegemonic naturalized
belief (in Christianity as well as in secular sciences and Western philosophy—remember, the Greek-Latin tradition translated into modern/imperial European languages) in its regional and partial place.
Conceptual de-linking begins by seeing through the assumptions
that the world is what my indoctrinated perspective says it is, and that
any other perspective either doesn’t exist or, if it does, is dangerous
because it is different. It consists in thinking (a) from the absent perspectives and (b) in critical perspective to the philosophical assumptions
that cast them (absent perspectives) as absent. Translate epistemology
into racism and you will understand what I am referring to: people
of color are absences and silences or, in the best possible world, recognized as “minorities.” To assume that the ways in which truth and
fiction were conceived in modern Europe (like Sansón Carrasco does)
were universally valid may have disastrous consequences. A century
after the expulsion of the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula, Cervantes
was certainly aware of the confrontations between Latin and Arabic,
and Christianity and Islam. The century of Christian and Castilian
expansion (a century reigned by Charles V and Philip II) was successful in reducing to absence or silence everything that was not Western
Christian and inscribed in the Greco-Roman tradition, a self-appointed
supremacy that was supported by the economic success of mercantile
capitalism.
Four hundred years after the publication of Don Quixote we should
celebrate it as a European contribution to the achievements of human
creativity and philosophical insights. However, in light of more than
fifty years of the second wave of decolonization and the increasing
numbers and characters of social movements contesting neoliberal globalization and proposing another globalization (which is indeed taking place around the world by intellectual and social movements that

14

Walter D. Mignolo

are de-linking from the totalitarian economic and neoliberal designs,
implementations, and narratives of its “beneficial” consequences), we
have the responsibility to bring to the foreground the silences and the
absences that both literary critics and historians reproduce in the name
of Don Quixote’s literary values as a monument of Spanish national history or a monument of Western civilization. In this context, Cervantes’s
political move should precede the attention that has been devoted to
the structure of the novel itself. Here, I am trying to follow Cervantes’s
teaching and ask what would be the twenty-first century equivalent of
what Cervantes did at the beginning of the seventeenth? I see two possible answers to this question. One would be the postmodern answer,
inscribed in the same European history of Cervantes and Don Quixote, which questions the very principles of modernity that Cervantes
contributed so much to install in the transition from the Theo- to the
Ego-politics of knowledge and understanding. This was precisely Foucault’s insight in his prologue to Les mots et les choses. The other answer
would be decolonial rather than postcolonial in nature. The decolonial
carries more weight than the postcolonial in the sense that decolonization of knowledge and being is a step that is not always clear in postcolonial talks, oriented more to solving problems in the academy than
in the world. Gandhi, Fanon, Césaire, Garvey, Du Bois, and Anzaldúa,
among others, are clear examples of a decolonial critique pointing
toward decolonization. Decolonization of knowledge and being are
two particular kinds of de-linking. The question is then to read Don
Quixote today from the conceptual frame introduced by these thinkers
and activists.
To celebrate Don Quixote without bringing into the debate, simultaneously, the need to de-link and decolonize knowledge and being
would contribute very little to the critical insights and dissenting arguments that Cervantes himself construed through his master narrative. Such mechanisms of power are very well known, and historical
examples abound. The case of Patrice Lumumba comes to mind. After
the forces of order killed him and chopped his body into pieces, they
celebrated him as a national hero of independence. Thus, the first point
in re-reading Don Quixote is to uncouple the myth and the danger of
making the novel a sacred object when Don Quixote was written precisely against subjectivities formed by sacred beliefs and for subjectivities formed by the emancipation of the secular subject, as Immanuel
Kant would have it almost two hundred years after Don Quixote. Don
Quixote is one of many expressions of a process in which the sover-

15

Macalester International

Vol. 17

eignty of the subject takes center stage instead of the subjection of the
subject to the dictates of God.6
To read Don Quixote today, and to follow the teaching of Cervantes
in writing it (that is, his contribution to the formation of a new European subjectivity—the modern sovereign subject), means to be aware
of the particular junction between Cervantes’s and the reader’s horizon
of expectations. When one hundred copies of Don Quixote were distributed in the Spanish colonies of the New World, it is easy to guess
why Indians and African slaves paid little attention to it.7 It is also easy
to guess that Spanish and Creole elites in their New World colonies
ignored this fact because Indians and African slaves were outside the
horizon of the civilized expectations of this Castilian elite. This is precisely the moment in which de-linking is required and decolonization
of knowledge and of being needs to be put into motion. Don Quixote
in all its marvelous condensation of several cultural codes of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Europe cannot be taken as a
direction and point of arrival for Indians and African slaves. Indians
and Afro-slaves have the same right to ignore Cervantes and Don Quixote that Cervantes, as well as his contemporary and present readers,
have had in ignoring Indians and Africans. A similar argument can be
made with respect to Arabic language and the world of Islamic faith
both at the time of Cervantes and in subsequent and current interpretations of the novel. At this point, I do not have specific information
regarding whether or when Don Quixote was translated into Arabic.
It should be noted, however, that Arab speakers and Islamic believers
had the same right to ignore Don Quixote as Cervantes had to ignore
the magnificent legacies of Arabic thoughts, in spite of the fact that
the original narrator of Don Quixote’s adventures was Cide Hamete
Benengeli.
My re-reading of Don Quixote starts, therefore, from the spatial epistemic fracture brought about by the original moment of modernity in
which the triumph of Christianity ensures a Western Christian and
later a European legacy grounded in Greek and Latin languages and
thoughts; that is, from the moment that the foundation of modern/colonial designs in the New World engendered the predictable reaction by
those who were not happy to be told what to do. Decolonial thinking,
like in Waman Puma de Ayala, is the moment of the epistemic fracture
that Western Christianity (and later on, the Civilizing Mission, Development, and Market Democracy) engendered and nourished. The
Middle East today is one example of that trajectory. Modernity/colo-
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niality is detrimental to the Arabic and Islamic worlds as well as to the
languages and religions of indigenous people in the New World and
Africa. By de-linking I mean precisely this: to read Don Quixote today
from the horizon of expectations of individuals and populations for
whom literacy and alphabetic writing did not mean what it meant for
Europeans (as theorized by Elio Antonio de Nebrija) and for whom the
question of authority and the subject in the transition from a Theo- to
an Ego-politics of knowledge and understanding (including aesthetics,
of course) was not really a problem. In other words, I am not saying
that it was bad or wrong to move from a Theo- to an Ego-politics of
knowledge and understanding in Europe (as we see it in Cervantes,
Bacon, and Descartes). That is what European men of the time needed
and I have no quarrel with it. What I am questioning is the universality
of such a moment of transition and, consequently, the fact that it has
been taken as a reference point for global history. Arabic and Islamic
people, as well as Indians and Africans, did not have the problem of
emancipating themselves from the Theo-politics of knowledge and
understanding or working toward an emancipated subject as the foundation of the second stage of “modernity,” grounded in Ego-politics,
which then defends and promotes the sovereignty of the subject and
the secular concept of reason. Indians and Africans in the New World
at the beginning of the seventeenth century were not in need of asserting the sovereignty of the subject and detaching it from the authority
of the past. Instead, Indians and Africans needed to decolonize the subject that was colonized under both the Theo-logical and the Ego-logical
European foundation of knowledge and understanding. Waman Puma
de Ayala introduced a spatial epistemic break and one of the first contributions to the politics of de-linking. But, of course, it was ignored
and silenced subsequently, until his manuscript was rediscovered in
1936. I will come back to the issue of the spatial epistemic break as a
crucial strategy of de-linking.
Today “we” (and I would suggest that this “we” has some global,
not universal, implication that I will soon explain) are facing a critical
moment of theoretical and political affirmation of the colonial/modern
subject. The colonial/modern subject is not a new one. It can be traced
back to the sixteenth century, precisely to the Spanish colonies of the
New World. The colonial subject (e.g., Indians and Africans “adapting”
to the colonial situations created by modernity, as well as the Moors
who were victims of the triumph of Christianity in the sixteenth century—and will be colonized by England and France in the nineteenth
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century) was not agonizing to emancipate from a concept of authority
that was linked to Theology and Latin. Ever since the sixteenth century, the modern/colonial subject was learning that it needed to be
liberated from the domination and supremacy of both the Theological
authority and the Ego-logical sovereign subject that Cervantes, Bacon,
and Descartes were promoting as emancipation.
De-linking not only means to detach oneself from the rules of the
game imposed by the hegemony of European Theo- and Ego-logical
politics of knowledge/understanding. It also means bringing into existence new and distinct politics of knowledge/understanding. The hegemony of concept and principles of knowledge established in Europe
since the Renaissance and through the Enlightenment (in its Theo- and
Ego-logical forms as the foundation of European modernity and postmodernity) created the conditions for what in the twentieth century
could be formulated as the “Geo-graphic” and “Bio-graphic”8 politics
of knowledge and understanding.
While Theo- and Ego-politics of knowledge have been hegemonic
both in their dominance as well as in their internal dissenting dominance—e.g., Marxism that projected a global emancipation based on
the model of the European proletariat that emerged with the Industrial Revolution—the Geo- and Bio-graphic politics of knowledge and
understanding brought new rules into the game, not only new players. It created, first of all, the spatial epistemic break that cannot be
subsumed under the temporal epistemological breaks (Foucault), paradigmatic changes (Kuhn), or the emergence of the modern subject
(Giddens). Secondly, it introduced epistemic principles tangentially
related (because of the expanding logic of coloniality after the conquest
and colonization of the New World) to Greek and Latin and more
directly related to categories of thought, memories, and social and
economic practices of non-European and imperial languages and histories (e.g., Arabic, Aymara, Hindi, Bengali, etc.). Thirdly, it revealed
the color of epistemology since Geo- and Body-politics of knowledge
were the responses from categories of thought founded in languages
and experiences of people of color (Waman Puma, Fanon, Gandhi)
and non-hegemonic sexual preferences (Anzaldúa). In other words,
the emergence of an epistemology grounded in colonial histories and
experiences of people of color and queers revealed that the Theo- and
Ego-politics of knowledge were rules established by white European
men. Finally, this “newness,” being spatial, cannot be subsumed under
the ideology of newness as a temporal justification of progress and of
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modernity as a point of arrival. Thus, it is not by chance that the Geopolitics of knowledge/understanding was articulated as such during
the Cold War, and not in Europe but in the periphery—in the Third
World by intellectuals of European descent (the case of Borges, but also
of Dussel). The Body-politics of knowledge/understanding was articulated as such also during the Cold War, as a growing consciousness
among people of color, women, and people of non-hegemonic sexual
preferences. In both cases, the right to know implied the necessary de-linking with the masculine, Christian, and white assumptions that founded the
Theo- and Ego-logical politics of knowledge/understanding. De-linking and
decolonization of knowledge go hand in hand. Consequently, reading
Don Quixote today from the perspective of the Geo- and Bio-graphic
politics of knowledge/understanding means to recognize, on the one
hand, the enormous importance of the book in the European transition
from the Theo- to the Ego-frames of knowledge and subjectivities. On
the other hand, it implies the need to reveal the silences and absences
of its horizons of expectation in which most of its critics and commentators (including Foucault) were caught.
Waman Puma de Ayala is one of many examples of the emergence
of the Geo- and Bio-politics of knowledge but, above all, he is a clear
example of de-linking.9 In contradistinction to Cervantes, Waman
Puma and the colonies were not concerned with the transition from the
Theo- to the Ego-logical subject. Waman Puma was, literally, in a different place and in a different skin, although at the same global time as
Cervantes. Waman Puma did not have to be concerned with the theological and textual authorities that Cervantes so masterfully explains
in the preface of Don Quixote. Waman Puma was of Cervantes’s generation but he was an Indian living in the Viceroyalty of Peru. He was concerned with the transformations of the subjects in the Incanate under
colonial rule and with the transformation of subjectivities as a consequence of the colonization of knowledge. The celebration of alphabetic
literacy was not in his mind. What he had in mind was the Kipukamayoc [Fig. 1], and how the Kipukamayoc under colonial rule and the
colonization of knowledge were transformed into the Kilkaykamayoc.
In other words, the Kilkaycamayoc is closer to the paradigm of the
literate subject [Fig. 2]. The Kilkaymamayoc has ink, pen, and a table
(instead of a set of knotted strings called Kipus) as an extension of its
hand [Fig. 3]. The materiality of writing in the transformation of the
colonial subject has transformed the Amauta into someone different: a
social role between Amauta and Philosopher; that is, between someone
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Figure 1. The quipu, like any other writing system, was a good tool in
the hands of the philosophers as well as the accountants for keeping
track of goods in the stores of the Inca, the head of Tawantinsuyu. Kipucamayoc (or quipucamayoc) was the name given to accountants, those
who were skillful in the use of the quipu. (From Guaman Poma, Neuva
corónica y buen govierno, completed circa 1610. Facsimile edition by John
Murra and Rolena Adorno, Mexico City: Siglo Ventiuno, 1982.)
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Figure 2. Albrecht Dürer, Erasmus of Rotterdam, 1526, engraving, Hood
Museum of Art, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire.
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Figure 3. The quipucamayoc became the quilcaycamayoc, since quilcay
was the name invented in the Quechua language to name the Spanish
writing system. In this plate we see the transformation of the quipucamayoc into the quilcaycamayoc, a good portrait of what could have been
the kind of double consciousness experimented with (in different ways
and to different degrees) by the people of the Inca Empire. (From Guaman Poma, Neuva corónica y buen govierno, completed circa 1610. Facsimile edition by John Murra and Rolena Adorno, Mexico City: Siglo
Ventiuno, 1982.)
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whose practice is to “read the signs of the world” [Fig. 4] into someone
who “loves wisdom,” according to the Greek tradition translated into
European imperial and modern languages. Finally, the imperial colonialization of knowledge/being implanted the very idea of “author”
(el autor camina) [Fig. 5] into Quechua and Aymara categories of thought.
“The autor camina” (which is the title of Fig. 5) is a transformation parallel to the transformation of the Kipukamayoc into the Kilkaykamayoc.
“The author” in this case is no longer the modern-subject (embodied
in and by Cervantes) but the colonial-subject (embodied in and by
Waman Puma). The colonial subject, that is, the coloniality of being, is
the condition from which decolonial thinking emerges; the need to free
and clear the coloniality of being. Still in other words, Waman Puma,
contrary to the emancipated modern-subject (Cervantes’s subject and
author), is a subject twice colonized: in its knowledge and in its being.
And this happened, remember, in a world coexisting with Cervantes
writing the novel and with the Spanish elites reading Don Quixote in
the New World, as Irving Leonard registered in his classic study The
Books of the Braves.10
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, readers were from aristocratic stock and wealthy pockets of the population. Leonard reports
that in the New World the reading sector of the society preferred bulky
novels, poetry, and ecclesiastical literature. The book trade itself was
highly profitable in the colonies. Pietistic and theological writings
were, of course, the stock and trade for booksellers, although 15% of
book shipments were miscellaneous secular works. Who among the
publishers in Spain and the New World and the Spanish reader of aristocratic stock would pay attention to what Waman Puma wrote? It was
not the fault of Cervantes, of course. Most likely if they had met, one
can imagine that Cervantes and Waman Puma could have been buddies, comrades, and teammates.
Waman Puma’s work questions authority in a different epistemic
mode than Cervantes. Nueva corónica could hardly have been composed
by a Spaniard for the simple reason that it would have been a miracle
if a Spaniard could have located himself in the place and skin of an
Indian who enjoyed both the knowledge and subjectivity of his family
and Indian ancestors and the subjectivity imposed by Spanish institutions and the Spaniards’ own ancestry. After Waman Puma was widely
recognized (thanks to the editions of John Murra and Rolena Adorno
as well as that of Franklin Peace), only a conservative Eurocentric mind
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Figure 4. Guaman Poma’s description of the astrólogo (amauta or philosopher) in an Inca cosmological setting, with the sun and the moon,
the masculine and the feminine, as complementary opposites. He also
carries a string of quipus, implement of the Inca writing system, within
the same logic of the ceque system (Guaman Poma, Neuva corónica y
buen govierno). The drawing reveals the coexistence, as in “El Pontificial Mundo,’’ of Spanish and Inca concepts of representation. This is a
good example of what Serge Gruzinski analyzes as “mestizo thinking”
(la pensée metisse). (From Serge Gruzinski, La pensée metisse. Paris:
Fayard, 1999.)
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Figure 5. The astrólogo (amauta or philosopher) has been converted, by
colonization, into an author. This plate is captioned “Camina el autor”
(the author is walking). While the amauta carried quipus in his hands,
the author carries a rosary. Furthermore, the author is being followed
by a horse, a companion that was unavailable to the amauta. (From
Guaman Poma, Neuva corónica y buen govierno, completed circa 1610.
Facsimile edition by John Murra and Rolena Adorno, Mexico City:
Siglo Ventiuno, 1982.)
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could have come out with the idea that if the Nueva corónica deserves
attention, then it could not have been composed by an Indian!
Of course, it was not Cervantes’s responsibility to be concerned with
Waman Puma’s situation. It would have been difficult if not impossible for Cervantes to know about Waman Puma. But once again, those
who surrounded Cervantes (the Church, the Court, the publishers who
were making money with Don Quixote) were not interested in the problems that the colonial subjects were facing, since as colonial subjects,
they were not considered human, intelligent, or creative enough to be
taken into account. Nueva corónica y buen gobierno was systematically
silenced until 1936, when a scholar discovered the manuscript in the
National Library of Copenhagen. However, the Church, the Crown,
and the publisher all supported the envoy of hundreds of copies of
Don Quixote to the colonies. Who was reading the book? It was not the
Indians or the African slaves, but the Spanish Creole population and
perhaps Mestizos (mixed blood, by pure white epistemology) of Spanish ideological descent.
The clearest example of de-linking and therefore shifting towards
a Geo- and Bio-politics of knowledge and understanding appears in
Waman Puma’s dialogue with the Dominicans (Domingo de Santo
Tomas, Las Casas, Vitoria). This is how the strategy works. Waman
Puma used Las Casas’s critique of the abuse of the Indians by the
Spaniards. But, of course, he did not support Las Casas’s project of
evangelization. At this point, Waman Puma’s argument was no longer
based on Las Casas’s Greek and Latin written tradition and authority, but rather on the oral tradition of Aymara and Quechua. Waman
Puma advanced an argument that was both an alternative to the just war
advocated by Ginés de Sepúlveda and an alternative to peaceful evangelization
advocated by Las Casas. Waman Puma was able to perform a conceptual
de-linking (and set the stage for a future decolonization of being) by
de-linking from the tyranny of written Greek and Latin authority and
tradition, and by bringing into the game the conceptual framework of
the authority and tradition orally inscribed in Aymara and Quechua.
De-linking implies border thinking and border epistemology, which
is clearly the outcome of Waman Puma’s Nueva corónica. Thus, while
Cervantes was contributing to a chronological epistemic break that
Foucault clearly articulated and celebrated, Waman Puma contributed
to a spatial epistemic break, to border thinking, and to the decolonization of knowledge and of being, despite the many people who reduced
him to silence in their celebration of European achievements.11
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*****
Thus, the introduction of the colonies (co-existing with but invisible
as history from the partial European experience) translated into total
European abstract universals at the turn of the seventeenth century.
This allows us to take a new look at some of the theories of the novel.
Lukacs, for example, sees Don Quixote as the first great novel of world
literature. He links this event to the time of crisis and transition when
“the Christian God began to forsake the world,” a time of “the demons
let loose, a period of great confusion of values in the minds of an as yet
unchanged value system. And Cervantes, the faithful Christian and
naively loyal patriot, creatively exposed the deepest essence of this
demonic problem: the purest heroism is bound to become grotesque;
the strongest faith is bound to become madness, when the ways leading to the transcendental home have become impossible.”12 Anthony
Cascardi, who distinguished himself for his analysis of the Spanish
Golden Age in the frame of European modernity, explores the meaning of secularization in Don Quixote. Cascardi links secularization to
a transition from the Middle Ages to “modernity.” He attempts a rereading of Lukacs’s idealistic language in the Theory of the Novel from
the materialistic perspective that Lukacs introduced in his History and
Class Consciousness. Cascardi’s thesis is the following:
I follow up Lukacs’s lead in arguing that the origins of literary modernity as reflected in Cervantes work may indeed be understood in terms
of the process of secularisation, but that we must regard ‘secularisation’
not just as the result of a change in the patterns of religious belief but as
a master-trope for the problem of authority as it is figured within literary
history. At the same time I suggest that the process of secularisation is
not anything happening in culture external to literature, but that literary history itself, as an effort to negotiate between the authorities of the
present and those of the past, is the best example of the ‘secularisation’
process whose consequences Lukacs is attempting to express.13

In both Lukacs’s and Cascardi’s works, “literary modernity” and
“secularization processes and modernity” are considered European
phenomena. In this regard, Don Quixote would be the secular equivalent (since secularization is conceived as taking place in Europe during
the transition from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment) of sacred
texts like the Torah, the Bible, the Bhagavad Gita, The Book of Changes,
and many others codified and transmitted in oral forms (e.g., Mexican
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expression for la flor y el canto, la tinta negra y la tinta roja, or many of
the African examples studied by missionaries and anthropologists). In
this regard, modernity is nothing more than a particular time-space
period in which a new concentration of forces took place. However,
the problem is that secularization and modernity are much more than
simple temporal and spatial markers. They are “keywords” of new
forms of life and social organization that became a point of reference
and arrival, and that went together with the process of globalization
that began in the sixteenth century. This “beginning” of globalization
was not, of course, defined by the general tendencies of human beings
to use their legs and arms (and their technological extensions, such as
tools, to dominate nature, to devastate the enemy in war, or to protect
themselves from intemperate climates, etc.) to move around the globe
populating it at will. Globalization thus conceived complements and
grounds the hegemony of universal history while it makes invisible global
histories that cannot be subsumed under one origin which is at the same time
uni-versal—that is, the belief that there is “one general beginning”14 and
an ascending order toward the final judgment in the Bible, or under the
completion of the project of modernity (in the secular version summarized by Habermas). The process of globalization that I am discussing
has a different beginning and a different perspective on the beginning:
it begins with the emergence of decolonial thinking and it carries the
decolonial perspective into the interpretation of global processes. That
is to say, it looks at the world from the perspective of global coloniality
instead of the perspective of global modernity. It is from this different
frame that I am trying to connect Don Quixote to global coloniality, and
to de-link from the hegemony of a universal history that was and continues to be told from the sacred perspective of the Bible, the secular
perspective of Hegel and Marx, and the neoliberal perspective of Huntington and Bhagwati.
Based on Cervantes’s preface to Don Quixote, Cascardi rightly underscores the question of authority linked to the process of secularization
and to modernity. As is well known, Cervantes made a strong point in
rejecting the tyranny and authority of the past. By doing so, he enforced
the authority of the individual and of the author. The dialogue with
Cervantes’s friend, or alter-ego, reinforces in a parody—cutting links
with the past—the servitude to the authority of the past and the freedom of the authority of Cervantes. It reveals the modern subject: “you
don’t need me to swear dear that I longed for this book, born out of my
own brain.” The first sentence of the prologue is as memorable as the
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first sentence of the narrative, “En un lugar de La Mancha.” The problem
of authority as affirmation of the subject (which has a philosophical
formulation thirty years later in Descartes’s famous, “I think, therefore
I am”) thus formulated was strictly a European problem.15
Almost one hundred years before Cervantes and Bacon, Spanish
chronicler Gonzálo Fernández de Oviedo was confronted with the
problem of writing about the “Indies” (Sumario de la natural y general
historia de las Indias, 1526). Facing a new “reality” that was unknown to
and undescribed by the classical authority that Oviedo could read, and
oblivious to the fact that this reality was known and described by the
people inhabiting the Caribbean and the continent, Oviedo decided
to affirm his own authority. In doing so, he disqualified the GrecoRoman authorities on the same ground, but he never thought that the
people inhabiting the Caribbean also had their own thoughts about the
experience. Oviedo was living as a Spaniard, educated in Italy in the
Greco-Latin tradition, and confronting people that he most likely did
not consider to be human. Indigenous knowledge in the New World
(equivalent to indigenous knowledge in Europe or in Africa) was not
recognized. Fernández de Oviedo was contributing to the authority of
experience and the sovereignty of the observing subject, not of books
and classical authors. He was still under the general frame of the Theopolitics of knowledge, as Jose de Acosta would be about seventy years
after Oviedo,16 but already moving to the Ego-logical principles of
knowledge and the shaping of subjectivities.
The major lesson here is that while in Europe the affirmation of the
subject was celebrated in an ascending process of emancipation from
the Theo-political epistemic frame and toward building the Ego-political frame (to wit, Cervantes’s critical reflections on authority and Descartes’s critical reflections on thought and subject), in the colonies the
new subjectivity consisted not in the sovereignty of being but in the coloniality of being, in the devaluation and expendability of human lives by
expropriating lands, racializing people to exploit their labor (mainly in
encomiendas and plantations), and depriving them of their own knowledge. The extirpation of idolatry, at its height in the final decades of
the sixteenth and early decades of the seventeenth centuries, was the
counter-face and hidden side of the Theo-logical authority as well as
the Ego-logical affirmation of self. We will have to wait more than 450
years until the consequences of the coloniality of being surfaces to the
level of decolonization of being and liberation similar to the European
emancipation of the sovereignty of being, to which Cervantes’s literary and
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Descartes’s philosophical reflections contributed. Thus, while celebrating Cervantes’s contribution to the European sovereignty of being, we
cannot be oblivious to two simultaneous historical processes in the
colonies. On the one hand, they consisted of the Christian and European (and lately the U.S.) colonization of beings by the implementation
of global designs under the name of Christian and civilizing missions,
development and modernization, market and democracy. On the other
hand, they consisted of the dissenting processes of the decolonization of
being that emerged as the critical consciousness of Indian and African
populations in America in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
and that re-emerged all over the world with the reproduction of global
coloniality enacted by liberal and capitalist imperial countries (England, France, and the U.S.).
The decolonization of being, which had been coming of age in the
twentieth century mainly through dispersed work around the world,17
is the equivalent of Cervantes, Bacon, and Descartes in seventeenthcentury Europe. The decolonization of being is the liberation from the
dominance of the Eurocentered Theo- and Ego-politics of being and
knowledge. It is simultaneously the affirmation of the Geo- and Biopolitics of knowledge and being. Liberation and decolonization mean
moving out of the logical and philosophical game to which Cervantes
and Descartes contributed so much. For that reason, the meaning of
Don Quixote, globally and from the perspective of the coloniality of
being and colonized subjectivities, is not necessarily a cause for joy and
celebration. While no one will question the achievements of Cervantes
and Descartes, recognition complements distance and critical change
of terrain in the reading of the “masterpieces” of the modern/colonial
world. These masterpieces are all, willingly or not, implicated in two
simultaneous sets of processes:
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the celebration of the emerging modern subject, the instauration of
a supreme Ego-logical frame of mind that displaced (not replaced
or erased) the Theo-logical one, and

•

the silencing of a newly emerging colonial subject and the devaluation of lives that did not correspond to the dominant Eurocentered values in philosophy and literature. The instauration of the
coloniality of being that, almost five hundred years later, follows
the example of Cervantes and Descartes by working toward the
decolonization of being in the same way that Cervantes and Des-
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cartes worked toward the emancipation of the modern subject in
the internal history of Europe.

*****
Most, if not all, readings of Don Quixote remained within the Western and Greco-Roman world. The readings that I referenced in my
argument are those that linked Don Quixote with modernity and
with the emergence of the sovereign modern subject. I brought to the
foreground the emergence of the decolonial subject in the work of
Waman Puma de Ayala in colonial Peru. This underlined the fact that
the canonical readings of Cervantes contributed to silencing the spatial epistemic breaks emerging in the colonies, epistemic breaks that
consisted of de-linking from the tyranny of Western civilization by
proposing to play the game with different rules, and denouncing the
incredible credulity of Spaniards and Christians (and subsequently the
hegemonic culture of Western Europe and the U.S.) for believing that
the sovereignty of the European subject was of universal value and
that everybody else on the planet had to bend to the dictates of Western categories of thought.18
Globalization could be interpreted and narrated (that is to say,
globalization more than an ontological and historical process is an
interpretation of socio-historical processes that do not have a name
inscribed in themselves) by considering only the local histories of
imperial global designs; that is, of what is said, planned, and enacted
by persons and institutions that are in a position to enforce their view
of life and society. It could also be interpreted and narrated by considering the local histories that bend to imperial forces or decolonial local
histories that, like the World Social Forum, propose another globalization. De-linking is perhaps the most radical move and imperative
toward an alternative globalization that should be enacted at every
level in the sphere of human activity. My argument here consists of a
simple example of what de-linking may look like and in what direction
it should go in the domain of knowledge and understanding. Anniversaries of masterpieces of genial authors could be maintained if society
considers them necessary. At this point, however, they should be read
from the perspective of projects oriented toward the decolonization of
knowledge and being.
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*****
A final remark: in the dialogue that followed my presentation and during the Roundtable the next day with Mary Gossy and Frederick de
Armas, Dean Ahmed I. Samatar presented as a plea to me the need to
make clear that not everything is bad in the West and not everything
is good in the Rest. Certainly, I cannot agree more. Yet obviously my
argument had left the impression that I was condemning the West
and glorifying the Rest. My belief in this respect is that there is no safe
place. Christianity can be totalitarian and liberating. Liberalism can be
totalitarian and liberating. Marxism can be totalitarian and liberating.
Islam can be totalitarian and liberating. Being Black or Latino is not a
guarantee of being progressive. Being gay or lesbian is not a guarantee
of being democratic.
Yet there is a totalitarian and imperial bent in the constitution of
the West, and I do not have any doubt about it. That same imperial
and totalitarian bent contributed to engendering the same situation
in the ex-colonies after liberation. Many African countries are a prime
example. In Latin America after the Cold War we have also seen a succession of totalitarian regimes supported by the United States. Saddam
Hussein is not the result of totalitarian tendencies in Islam, but of the
complicity of colonial with totalitarian regimes in the West (Western
liberal and Russian communist imperialisms).
Because there is no safe place, we can think about Samatar’s rightly
cautionary note in the following terms. While in Europe in 1955, Martinican intellectual and public figure Aimé Césaire observed the striking co-relation between colonialism and Hitler. It would be worthwhile,
said Césaire, to study clinically and in detail, step by step, how Hitler
“applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been
reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the ‘coolies’ of India and
the ‘niggers’ of Africa.”19
Not surprisingly, but independently from Césaire, Canan Makiya
published in 1989, under the pseudonym of Samir al-Khalil, a book
titled Republic of Fear.20 You can imagine both contexts: Césaire writing
shortly after WWII and Makiya shortly before the Gulf War. Saddam
Hussein had been in power for some time by 1989. Makiya dissected
the character of Hussein and concluded that his regime was modelled
upon European totalitarian movements: the Nazis, fascists, and communists. The picture is clear. There is a curved line that goes from
regimes of violence in the European colonies to regimes of violence in
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Europe itself, and back to the Third World, as models for regimes such
as Saddam Hussein’s. The darker side of modernity is what unites the
West with the Rest in regimes of violence. We only hope that decoloniality will bring about lines of peace and liberation, moving back and
forth from ex-colonies and beyond to end the imperial complicities
between the European Union, the U.S., Japan, and Israel.
De-linking means precisely to de-link from Western totalitarian
epistemology and its consequences in the ex-colonies of liberal/Christian and communist imperialism (in spite of Vladimir Lenin who saw
imperialism as only linked to capitalism and not to communism). Delinking takes us to decolonial thinking; that is, to a world that can no
longer be imagined from within the hegemonic categories of thought
that the Renaissance and Enlightenment elevated to a universal credo
and which selected Greek and Latin as the only two languages and
cosmologies of its foundation. The remaining languages, cosmologies,
social and economic organizations, subjectivities, and human interactions were all subjected to the final judgment of Greek and Latin and
the six modern European imperial languages. To de-link means to
remove oneself from that tyranny and to reinvest in what has been
silenced, to make visible what has been rendered invisible, to affirm
the presence of what has been declared absent. Categories of thought
derived from Greek and Latin and translated into modern European
languages are today global. De-linking and the decolonial shift require
border thinking: thinking from the spaces that have been rendered
silent and absent by the hegemony of Western categories of thought. In
this regard, Don Quixote will be a good road companion, if we can delink from the cage in which canonical interpretations have continued
to place it. 
•
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exploitation of labor, and racial devaluation of human lives, chiefly Indians and Black
Africans.
16. Acosta 1590; Mignolo 2000.
17. On the colonization of being, see Walter D. Mignolo, “Thinking Possible Futures:
The Network Society and the Coloniality of Being,” The Joan Carslile Irving Lectures,
1999–2000—Upheavals: Cultural Aftermath. Department of Fine Arts, Art History and
Theory, University of British Columbia (March 30, 2000); Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling
the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom,” New Centennial Review 3, no. 3 (2003):
257–337; and Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “The Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of
Knowledge, Modernity, Empire, Coloniality,” City 8, no. 1 (2004): 29–56.
18. Remember that when I say “West,” I mean the Greek and Latin foundations of the
imperial languages of European modernity: Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, and English.
19. Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism [1955], translated by Joan Pinkham (New York:
Monthly Review, 2000), p. 36.
20. Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear. The Politics of Modern Iraq, Revised edition (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991).

35

